Globale Mass Surveillance
<div><span style="font-size:16px;">New KGB Takes Internet by SORM</span></div><div><br></div><div>The Russian government has just authorized itself to spy on everything its citizens do on the Net -- and to punish ISPs that won't help. So much for post-Soviet civil rights.</div><div><br></div> www.motherjones.com The Russian government has just authorized itself to spy on everything its citizens do on the Net -- and to punish ISPs that won't help. So much for post-Soviet civil rights.
<div>Without a warrant, Canada uses free airport Wi-Fi service to gather the communications of all travelers.</div><div><br></div><div>http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/06/10/nsa-surveillance-canada-_n_3416730.html</div>
<div>U.S. surveils </div><div>- Phone</div><div>- Internet</div><div>- Financial System</div><div>- Travel</div><div>- Email</div><div>- Social Network</div><div><br></div><div>https://nsa.gov1.info/surveillance/</div>
<div>China (state enemy of the internet) Surveils:</div><div>- Phone</div><div>- Internet</div><div>- Financial System</div><div>- Travel</div><div>- Block Internet</div><div>- Censorship</div><div>- Social Network</div><div><br></div><div>http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/how-china-uses-mass-surveillance-big-data-snooping-curb-social-unrest-1555880</div>
<div>Australia Surveils:</div><div>- Phone</div><div>- Internet</div><div>- Financial</div><div>- Travel</div><div><br></div><div>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance_in_Australia</div>
<div>The Indian parliament passed the Information Technology Act of 2008 with no debate, giving the government fiat power to tap all communications without a court order or a warrant.</div>
<div>The right to privacy is a highly developed area of law in Europe. The Data Protection Directive regulates the processing of personal data within the European Union. For comparison, the US has no data protection law that is comparable to this.</div>
<div>Iran (state enemies</div><div>of the internet)</div>
<div><span style="font-size:16px;">Mexico Adopts Alarming Surveillance Legislation</span></div><div><br></div><div>The Mexican government today adopted a surveillance legislation that will grant them warrantless access to real time user location data. The bill was adopted almost unanimously with 315 votes in favor, 6 against, and 7 abstentions. It has been sent to the President for its approval.</div><div><br></div> www.eff.org The Mexican government today adopted a surveillance legislation that will grant them warrantless access to real time user location data. The bill was adopted almost unanimously with 315 votes in favor, 6 against, and 7 abstentions. It has been sent to the President for its approval.
<div><span style="font-size:16px;">Stalker Law, or How Did The Government Legalize Mass Surveillance of Innocent Peruvians</span></div><div><br></div><div>Peruvians understand the dangers of pervasive surveillance. Peru's ex-spy chief, Vladimiro Montesinos is serving a long jail sentence for corruption and human rights abuses. In 2000, Peruvian authorities seized about 2,400 videotapes made by Montesinos, which he used to manipulate political opponents and journalists whom he caught on film, a scandal also known as the “Vladivideos”.</div><div><br></div> www.eff.org Peruvians understand the dangers of pervasive surveillance. Peru's ex-spy chief, Vladimiro Montesinos is serving a long jail sentence for corruption and human rights abuses. In 2000, Peruvian authorities seized about 2,400 videotapes made by Montesinos, which he used to manipulate political...
<div><span style="font-size:16px;">Brazil as the Global Guardian of Internet Freedom?</span></div><div><br></div> www.hrw.org Brazil as the Global Guardian of Internet Freedom?
<div><span style="font-size:16px;">UN report shows SA government must start respecting human rights!</span></div><div><br></div><div>SA government must start respecting human rights! Stop surveillance, protect activists, and prosecute the Marikana murderers R2K welcomes the UN Human Rights Committee’s hard-hitting report o…</div><div><br></div> www.r2k.org.za SA government must start respecting human rights! Stop surveillance, protect activists, and prosecute the Marikana murderers R2K welcomes the UN Human Rights Committee’s hard-hitting report o…
<div><span style="font-size:16px;">'You are being watched!' Egypt's mass Internet surveillance</span></div><div><br></div><div>It seems that the Egyptian government is no longer satisfied with the traditional methods of censorship of the Internet and all means of communication in general. For years this censorship has hinged on the legal prosecution of users on different charges, but now the government is attempting to deve</div><div><br></div> www.madamasr.com It seems that the Egyptian government is no longer satisfied with the traditional methods of censorship of the Internet and all means of communication in general. For years this censorship has hinged on the legal prosecution of users on different charges, but now the government is attempting to deve
<div><span style="font-size:16px;">7 ways Saudi Arabia is silencing people online</span></div><div><br></div><div>Raif Badawi is serving a 10-year prison sentence in Saudi Arabia, mainly for setting up a website. We talk to another local blogger – who has to remain anonymous for their own safety – about different tactics the authorities use to silence people online.</div><div><br></div> www.amnesty.org Raif Badawi is serving a 10-year prison sentence in Saudi Arabia, mainly for setting up a website. We talk to another local blogger – who has to remain anonymous for their own safety – about different tactics the authorities use to silence people online.
<div><span style="font-size:16px;">Turkey shuts down TIB internet surveillance and censorship bureau - D8 News</span></div><div><br></div><div>Turkey has formally shut down its Presidency of Telecommunication and Communication (TIB) as part of an ongoing crackdown on groups and individuals allegedly involved in the 15 July military coup attempt. The institution, founded in August 2005 and tasked with the oversight of telecoms and internet surveillance and censorship orders, has been in the spotlight during recent years for its …</div><div><br></div> d8news.com Turkey has formally shut down its Presidency of Telecommunication and Communication (TIB) as part of an ongoing crackdown on groups and individuals allegedly involved in the 15 July military coup attempt. The institution, founded in August 2005 and tasked with the oversight of telecoms and internet surveillance and censorship orders, has been in the spotlight during recent years for its …
<div>Building Syria’s surveillance state: new Privacy International investigation launched today</div> www.privacyinternational.org What do Egypt, Kenya, Turkey, Guinea, and Sweden have in common? Despite having a Constitutional right to privacy, they are adopting and enforcing policies that directly challenge this human right. These states are also up for a Universal Periodic Review this year before the United Nations Human Rights Council. UPRs are a mechanism within the Council aimed at improving the human rights situation in all countries and address human rights violations wherever they occur.
<div>Nigerian government under fire for expansion of surveillance programs</div> www.privacyinternational.org A sizeable political controversy has engulfed President Goodluck Jonathan’s Government in Nigeria, where details surrounding its plans for the total surveillance of Africa’s most populous country continue to emerge. Thanks to pervasive snooping technology readily found and developed in the US, UK, Israel and the Netherlands, the already spy-equipped security forces in Nigeria will have greater and more intimate access to the lives of some 56 million Internet users and 115 million active fixed and mobile phone subscribers. The plans have been roundly condemned by Nigeria’s civil society and press, who fear a drift back to Nigeria’s dictatorial past and to the threat it poses to their fundamental human rights. The apparent lack of any meaningful judicial framework and oversight for the deployment of the technology has so far not stopped government authorities pushing ahead with increased surveillance. Inevitably, Nigeria’s administration has been quick to cite the threat posed by Boko Haram – a militant Islamist movement operating in the country – as justification, and officials are reported to have even pointed to the Snowden revelations as validation for the surveillance state. (In)Security we trust The implications of surveillance and freedom of expression are particularly well understood in Nigeria, having has only recently emerged from military dictatorship. However, Nigerian activists fear that their government are justifying their push to expand their surveillance capabilties by playing on fears of insecurity and the threat of terrorism, lines routinely used by governments around the world to justify intrusions into privacy, the suppression of dissent and gross violations of fundamental human rights. These fears a certainly justified. Earlier this year, four journalists were reportedly arrested by security forces for writing that President Jonathan had instructed that “everything be done to frustrate the merged opposition parties”, including the surveillance of opposition. Amnesty International last year highlighted horrific human rights abuses by the security forces in Nigeria in response to attacks, including enforced disappearances, torture, extrajudicial executions, the torching of homes and detention without trial. Against this backdrop, civil society and industrial bodies in Nigeria have become increasingly concerned with the lack of an existing legal framework in which surveillance systems can operate, with no laws governing the interception of private communications. So when the telecommunications regulator, the Nigeria Communications Commission, circulated a Draft Lawful Interception of Communications Regulation in May this year (in light of the fact that primary legislation has been slow to make its way through Nigeria’s National Assembly), it was met with opposition by the telecommunications industry itself on privacy grounds. Nevertheless, following the publication of the regulation, the NCC invited tenders for the award of 25 consultancies: A Consultancy on Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering Activities; Review of the Readiness of Social Media Networks and its Implications for Telecommunications Regulation and National Security; Development of a Technical Framework for Data Filtering in Telecommunications Networks; and Development of a Technical Framework for the Use of Social Media Networks. In addition to the Draft Lawful Interception of Communications Regulation, a Cyber Security Bill focusing on security, crime prevention and protecting infrastructure is also up for review by parliament this year. This bill has also raised many red flags, as it could severely impact upon privacy and freedom of expression by allowing authorities to target users without judicial oversight. Buy! Buy! Buy! Despite the current legislative uncertainty, and the legitimate fears of stakeholders and people from across Nigeria, the groundwork for creating a massive surveillance regime in Nigeria is already being laid, with the shopping spree to acquire surveillance technology under way. In April, Israeli Elbit Systems announced a $40 million contract with “a country in Africa” for its Wise Intelligence Technology, presumably unaware of the fact that Nigeria’s 2013 federal budget allotted $60 million for a “Wise Intelligence Network Harvest Analyser System”, among other surveillance systems. Sources within the government confirmed the deal to reporters for the Premium Times - much to the dismay of President Jonathan. No stranger to controversy, Elbit - a company subject to disinvestment from a substantial amount of global funds because they provide surveillance for the separation wall in Israel - revealed that it would provide a “highly advanced end-to-end solution,” to Nigeria. By supporting “every stage of the intelligence process”, the system will allow the Nigerian security forces full access to the emails and internet usage within the country. And earlier this year, researchers from Citizen Lab, a research project based at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, found evidence of the presence of the US-based Blue Coat Systems and the UK-based Gamma International in Nigeria. Blue Coat’s technology, primarily aimed at network management, can also be used for surveillance and tracking, and has also been found in a host of sensitive, rights-abusing regimes, including Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. And as reported here previsouly, Gamma’s FinFisher is one of the most obtrusive surveillance systems on the market. Most recently, however, the Dutch company Digivox, which specialises in “lawful and tactical interception systems" - GPS tracking devices, voice logging, monitoring centres used for the interception of all modern communicaitons - has been linked to Nigeria and its ever-expanding surveillance apparatus. Speaking at an event to review the NCC’s draft regulation for the interception of communication, the President of the Association of Telecommunication Companies of Nigeria, Lanre Ajayi, reportedly revealed the relationship between Nigeria and the Dutch company. Displaying a screenshot from the Digivox website, the audience learned that Nigeria’s State Security Services and the main GSM network providers in the country deploy Digivox technology, and that Digivox lists the country and its telcos as references to the company’s capabilities. At the moment, the company’s exports are currently unregulated by Dutch authorities, and have been sold to law enforcement and intelligence agencies in over 15 countries worldwide, accordingto Digivox's website. Africa’s Surveillance Giant This shopping spree is ostensibly spurred by the demand for better intelligence in face of continued attacks by the violent extremist movement Boko Haram ("Western Education is Sinful"). Boko Haram asserts an Islamic Jihadist narrative; the group is estimated to have killed 3,600 people in Nigeria since 2009 while targeting mainly “Western” and Christian sites as well as mosques and Muslim schoolchildren. While some reports have been quick to paint the group as an al-Qaeda “cell” motivated by religious sectarianism, others look to their location in the North East of the country and argue that their motivations are more convincingly explained within the local context and by regional fractures related to territory, ethnicity, marginalization, and the economy. Similarly to government authorities in the US and UK, Nigerian federal government figures justify disproportionate and unnecessary surveillance practices on the grounds of national security. “Everywhere in the world, e-mails are seen by government”, asserts Nigeria’s Information minister, Labaran Maku, adding that “Even, the world super-power, America, spies on citizens’ mails to checkmate the activities of unscrupulous elements capable of threatening its internal security.” While Maku is certainly not wrong about the actions of the US, he fails to mention the fact that such surveillance programmes are based on highly dubious legal grounds and currently subject to several legal challenges within the UK, the US and at the European Court of Human Rights. But what is perhaps more worrisome is that this quote encapsulates how surveillance measures undertaken by the Five Eyes (USA, Canada, UK, Australia, and New Zealand) set precedents around the world for “acceptable” government actions. Not only, then, are companies based in these countries exporting their surveillance technologies around the world with no governmental oversight, these governments are now also exporting their surveillance policies, allowing all nations to claim legitimacy to whatever mass and invasive spying regimes a State seeks to build.
<div><span style="font-size:16px;">Biometrics in Argentina: Mass Surveillance as a State Policy</span></div> www.eff.org Two years ago, the UK dismantled their national ID scheme and shredded their National Identity Registry in response to great public outcry over the privacy-invasive program. Unfortunately privacy protections have been less rosy elsewhere. In Argentina, the national ID fight was lost some time ago. A law enacted during the military dictatorship forced all individuals to obtain a government-mandated ID. Now, they are in the process of enhancing its mandatory National Registry of Persons (RENAPER) with biometric data such as fingerprints and digitized faces. The government plans to repurpose this database in order to facilitate “easy access” to law enforcement by merging this data into a new, security-focused integrated system. This raises the specter of mass surveillance, as Argentinean law enforcement will have access to mass repositories of citizen information and be able to leverage existing facial recognition and fingerprint matching technologies in order to identify any citizen anywhere.
<div>Ethiopia expands surveillance capacity with German tech via Lebanon</div> www.privacyinternational.org German surveillance technology company Trovicor played a central role in expanding the Ethiopian government's communications surveillance capacities, according to a joint investigation by Privacy International and netzpolitik.org. The company, formerly part of Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN), provided equipment to Ethiopia's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) in 2011 and offered to massively expand the government's ability to intercept and store internet protocol (IP) traffic across the national telecommunications backbone. Trovicor's proposal was to double the government's internet surveillance capacity: two years' worth of data intercepted from Ethiopian networks would be stored. Trovicor's predecessor in intelligence solutions, Siemens Pte worked closely with its British partner Gamma Group International via an offshore company in Lebanon to expand lawful interception in the east African country. Gamma Group's highly intrusive FinFisher malware suite was used to target Ethiopian dissidents. Forensic traces of FinFisher malware have also been traced back to one of Gamma's Lebanese operations. Together, the companies and their Lebanese offshore subsidiaries helped one of Africa's most repressive governments spy on one of its largest populations. Backdoors to the backbone Since 1991, Ethiopia has been governed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPDRF), a coalition of ethnically-based political parties that has severely restricted freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. Police has and security forces have been accused of torture. The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), an Ethiopian intelligence agency has used intercepted communications data to identify and punish targets it perceives as opposed to the government. Journalists, activists and average citizens widely assume that their communications are extensively monitored. Phone records and transcripts have also been used to extract confessions under torture, according to Human Rights Watch. The Information Network Security Agency (INSA), created in 2011, consolidated and extended the state's surveillance and censorship of internet traffic. It is reported to have used 'deep packet inspection' which allows for the inspection and rerouting of internet traffic as it passes an inspection point and fulfils certain criteria defined by the inspecting agent. In 2012, it blocked access to the anonymous browsing service Tor, further restricting safe spaces for communication. INSA is alleged to be the agency responsible for using offensive malware from Italy-based Hacking Team in 2013 and 2014 to target journalists. Ethio Telecom runs the country's phone and internet services as a state-owned monopoly. In 2010, the Ethiopian government contracted France Telecom to manage the company, changed its former name and embarked on a serious expansion of the country's infrastructure. While good news for rural Ethiopians who have much less access to quality communications services, the government also expanded its surveillance capacities to match. Trovicor was central to this expansion plan. The Munich-headquartered company sells monitoring centres to government and law enforcement clients worldwide to capture, monitor, analyse and store all data acquired during investigation activities transmitted on a wide spectrum of networks. Trovicor technicians work to integrate interception gateways provided by Trovicor or partner companies into network infrastructure of service providers to funnel communications data to the monitoring centres. Trovicor continues the work of Nokia Siemens Network (NSN), a Helsinki-based joint venture of German conglomerate Siemens AG and Finnish telecoms company Nokia. In 2009, NSN sold its intelligence wing 'Siemens Intelligence Solutions' to Perusa Partners Fund 1 LP, a private investment firm, amid controversy that it supplied of surveillance systems to Iran. Perusa renamed its new acquisition 'Trovicor.' In January 2010, two representatives of the company presented an Ethiopian customer with a detailed operational plan to massively expand the government's capacity to monitor IP traffic, according to a document obtained by netzpolitik.org. Ethiopia's fiber optic backbone carries the country's mobile and internet traffic. Signals travel across Ethiopia through many different traffic routers including local and regional routers and international gateways. IP traffic originating or travelling abroad, for example to and from Gmail's US-based storage servers, would pass through internet gateways at three sites. In 2010, the existing fiber optic cable routes radiated from Addis Abeba along the country's roadways to key towns including Gonder and the Sudan border to the northwest, Mek'ele to the North, Nekemte to the West, Awassa to the south, Dire Dawa to the East and out to the Red Sea via Djibouti. That year, the government planned to add 37 new fiber routes covering a distance of around 10,000 kilometers and reaching further into rural Ethiopia. The government required massively expanded powers to intercept IP traffic across the new and existing cables. The government was to add new local-level 'edge routers' (ER) to 25 new locations. At each of these ER, Trovicor proposed, the company would install its own next generation network (NGN) taps. These taps would not interfere with the transmission of the signal. Instead, they would also transmit traffic from the ER to a Trovicor aggregation switch that would transmit the signal to the government's monitoring centre – provided by Trovicor. The monitoring centre would require data from all 25 new aggregation switches to be provided to it on a single 10GbE link. The government would double its storage and archiving capacity under Trovicor's plan. Two years' worth of data transmitted across Ethiopian networks could now be analysed. A total of 3 terabytes could be stored online and actively queried by monitoring centre analysts; a further 28 terabytes of material could be archived. With Trovicor's plan, analysts would be able to locate a mobile caller based on his or her proximity to cell phone towers. Trovicor offered to add this geolocation capacity – a “very cheap solution in comparison to the positioning systems” – to the monitoring centre and to integrate the centre with the network architecture provided by Chinese company ZTE. Throughout this period Ethio Telecom regularly conducted business with Nokia and Siemens companies, some of it for lawful interception, according to records obtained by Privacy International. It is not clear whether Trovicor was ultimately chosen to expand network interception capacities according to the January 2010 plan. Trovicor was, however, doing business in Ethiopia in 2011. In June 2011 the company sent a shipment to the NISS security agency from Munich to Frankfurt and onwards to Addis Abeba via an Ethiopian Airways flight, according to company records. Its exact contents are unknown. Trovicor and Siemens did not respond to requests for comment. The Lebanese Connection The 7th floor of Broadway Building in Beirut's fashionable Hamra district houses two surveillance technology companies – Elaman and Gamma Group, or rather, their offshore affiliates. Headquartered in Munich, Elaman sells a range of surveillance equipment, from communications monitoring centres to specialist cameras and body-worn call interception devices. It is also a distributor and close partner of the British surveillance consortium Gamma Group. Elaman marketed FinFisher, a malware suite that allows its user to access all stored data and even to take control of the microphone and camera, before Gamma took over the promotion and leadership behind the product in the late 2000s. The Elaman-Gamma partnership had “successfully been involved over the past five years in projects and contracts worth more than 200 million euros”, according to one brochure. Both companies provide powerful surveillance technology via Lebanon. Four joint stock companies – Elaman - German Security Solutions SAL, Gamma Group International SAL, Gamma Cyan SAL Offshore, and Cyan Engineering Services SAL – share the same registered address, above the Beirut offices of humanitarian charity Save the Children. Siemens paid one of these companies, Gamma Group International SAL, for an “Ethiopia Lawful Interception” project sometime before July 2011. Gamma Group International SAL's business is facilitated by Nabil Imad who appears as a beneficiary on a bank account attributed to Gamma, according to information obtained by Privacy International. Lebanese law requires joint stock companies, known by the French acronym SAL, to have between three and 12 shareholders, the majority of whom must be Lebanese. Nabil 'Sami' Imad is listed as the director of both Gamma Cyan SAL and Elaman SAL while 'Sami Nabil Imad' appears as director of Gamma Group International SAL. Mohammad Farid Mattar, a lawyer representing the heir of assassinated former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, is also listed as a director of Gamma Group International SAL. The Lebanese company's only listed non-Lebanese shareholder is its chairman, Louthean John Alexander Nelson. Nelson directs Gamma Group International Ltd. Gamma Group and Mattar both declined to offer comment. In a written response to Privacy International’s and Netzpolitik’s questions regarding the operation, a lawyer for Gamma would neither confirm nor deny the details of this report. The same lawyer, speaking on Mr. Mattar’s behalf, would neither confirm nor deny Mr. Mattar's involvement. The “Ethiopia Lawful Interception” project could have been to integrate FinFisher into an Ethiopian Trovicor monitoring centre. Trovicor has offered to supply Gamma products to governments worldwide, including in Tajikistan in 2009. A 2010 Gamma Group newsletter celebrated a new partnership with Trovicor based on successful collaboration in joint ventures. Wikileaks has identified that Gamma employees Stephan Oelkers and Johnny Debs visited Ethiopia in 2013 and Elaman CEO Holger Rumscheidt visited in 2012. The combination of the two companies' capabilities at the time – massive monitoring centres and the deployment of the FinFisher malware – presents a very concerning capability in the hands of a repressive government. FinFisher was used to target members of the Ethiopian political movement, Ginbot 7. Researchers at the Citizen Lab, a technology laboratory based in Canada, analyzed malware samples and determined that a FinFisher campaign originating in Ethiopia used pictures of Ginbot 7 members as bait to infect users – the corrupted files, when opened, would install the spyware onto the user's device. FinFisher was deployed against Ethiopians living abroad as well. Tadesse Kersmo is a London-based lecturer and member of Ginbot 7. Suspecting that his device was compromised, in 2013, he submitted his computer to Privacy International which, in collaboration with a research fellow of the Citizen Lab, analysed the device and found traces of FinFisher malware. The Citizen Lab's forensic analysis of FinFisher samples obtained elsewhere have linked certificates for the samples to Cyan Engineering Services SAL. Kersmo used to use his computer to keep in touch with his friends and family and continued to advocate for democracy back in Ethiopia. With his chats and Skype calls logged, his contacts accessed, and his video and microphone remotely switched on, it was not only Kersmo that was threatened, but also every member of the movement. Meanwhile in Germany, where Trovicor is headquartered and Gamma GmbH had an office before they transformed into FinFisher GmBH, German authorities maintain that they are unaware of either company supplying surveillance equipment to Ethiopia. After an investigation prompted by mounting evidence that German companies are leaders in the sale of surveillance technology worldwide, the German export agency said in a letter to the Bundestag that it found no records of any sale of surveillance technology to Ethiopia. However, the absence of records does not mean that no sales were made; unlike the sale of arms and other military equipment that necessitate the consideration of the human rights implications of a sale by export authorities, the sale of surveillance technology was not covered by any export regulation at the time of its export, allowing companies and their customers to trade free from any public scrutiny. Back in Ethiopia, journalists, activists and many ordinary citizens self-censor in the face of constant government surveillance of their private communications. “We use so many code words and avoid talking directly about so many topics that often I’m not sure I know what we are really talking about” said one person who spoke with Human Rights Watch. Thousands of kilometres away, European companies and their slightly closer Lebanese entities are responsible for these silences. The European Union is currently considering if and how to regulate exports of surveillance technologies that lead to abuses of human rights. For more information, visit Privacy International or the Coalition Against Unlawful Surveillance Exports.